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other farm property.28  In the event of loss from disease, the
reinvestment must be in replacement animals.29
In a 1985 U.S. District Court case,30 involving loss of
cattle from brucellosis, the taxpayer argued that the bacteria
or organisms causing the disease were transmitted to the
animals from the environment.  Had the court bought that
argument, the proceeds could have been invested in "other
farm property."31  The court held that such a result would
render the animal disease provision impotent which the
court was unwilling to do.32
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1 I.R.C. § 451(e).  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law
§ 27.03[7][d] (1996); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors had requested a
discharge at the end of their plan period but a creditor
objected that all disposable income had not been paid to the
trustee. The debtors argued that 326 calves should not have
been included in the debtors’ assets because the calves were
not of marketable weight during the plan period. The court
held that, although the calves would not receive full value,
the calves did have some value and that value would be
included in the debtors’ assets as disposable income.  The
debtors also argued that government payments received
after the end of the plan period should not have been
included in disposable income. The court held that the
payments were included because the payments related to
activities which occurred during the plan. The debtors
argued that payments made on a real estate loan and for real
property taxes during the plan period reduced the disposable
income. The court found that the loan payments and taxes
were not due until after the plan period was over; therefore,
the court held that the payments did not reduce disposable
income. In re Hammrich, 98 F.3d 388 (8th Cir. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had first filed for
Chapter 7 and, when that case was completed, filed for
Chapter 13. The IRS filed only a small claim for taxes and
penalties, but the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for full
payment of a much larger tax claim filed by the debtor but
did not include some employment taxes. The IRS had notice
of the Chapter 13 action but failed to object or appeal the
plan or discharge in the Chapter 13 case. However, the IRS
made several attempts to collect the unpaid taxes by
assessment, letter and levy against the debtor’s property and
wages. With each violation of the automatic stay, the IRS
abated its efforts after contact by the debtor’s attorney. The
debtor sought recovery of attorney’s fees necessitated by the
IRS’s six violations of the automatic stay. The court rejected
the IRS argument that the IRS made the collection attempts
because the IRS reasonably believed that the taxes were not
discharged in the Chapter 13 case. The court held that the
IRS argument was inconsistent with its actions to halt
collection after each contact by the debtor’s attorney. The
court awarded the debtor $1,500 in attorney’s fees and
related travel costs incurred by the debtor. In re Thibodaux,
201 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
Although the IRS received notice of the debtors’ Chapter
7 case, the IRS made a post-petition levy against the
debtors’ bank account causing several checks issued by the
debtors to incur insufficient funds charges when the checks
were returned unpaid to local merchants. The debtors sought
recovery of the charges, $2,000 for “trauma and
embarrassment” and punitive damages. The court allowed
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recovery of the bank charges plus 150 percent of that
amount for the trauma and embarrassment, but held that no
punitive damages could be awarded against the IRS. In re
Davis, 201 B.R. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996).
DISMISSAL. The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 7
case in which a federal tax claim was held to be
nondischargeable because of the debtor’s willful failure to
pay taxes. The IRS had a tax lien on the debtor’s property
and had levied against the debtor’s only asset, monthly
social security payments. The debtor filed for Chapter 13
when the eligibility requirements were increased, and the
IRS moved to dismiss the case and objected to the plan,
both on the grounds of bad faith. The IRS argued that,
because the tax debt was the only debt involved in the case
and because the debt was nondischargeable, the filing of the
Chapter 13 case was in bad faith. The Bankruptcy Court
held that, under its holding in In re Gathright, 67 B.R. 384
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986), app. dismissed, 71 B.R. 343 (E.D.
Pa. 1987), there was no good faith filing requirement for
Chapter 13 cases. The District Court reversed on this point,
holding that the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy actions to evade
payment of the taxes were “cause” for dismissal of the case.
The Bankruptcy Court also held that only debtor misconduct
or fraud in the bankruptcy proceeding can give rise to bad
faith sufficient to deny confirmation of a plan or discharge
in Chapter 13. Because the debtor had accurately filed all
schedules and met all Chapter 13 requirements,
confirmation could not be denied for bad faith. The District
Court affirmed on this point but dismissed the case based on
its first holding. The appellate court held that the debtor’s
pre-bankruptcy tax actions could not be used as a basis for
dismissal of the bankruptcy case. The appellate court,
however, held that a Chapter 13 case could be dismissed for
cause because of the debtor’s bad faith. On remand, the
Bankruptcy Court ruled that the case would not be
dismissed if the debtor amended the plan to extend
payments for 60 months and allowed the IRS relief from the
automatic stay in order to pursue recovery of property
improperly transferred to the debtor’s spouse. In re Lilley,
201 B.R. 725 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), on rem from, 91
F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’g in part and rev’g in part,
185 B.R. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev’g and aff’g, 181 B.R.
809  (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
SETOFF.  The IRS filed a claim for pre-petition taxes
owed by the debtor. Post-petition, the IRS discovered that a
refund was due to the debtor for another prepetition tax year
and refunded all of the refund except funds sufficient to pay
all of the debtor’s tax liability, including a post-petition
liability. The IRS informed the trustee of its intent to make
the setoffs but delayed in obtaining relief from the automatic
stay to make the setoffs. The court held that the refund was
a pre-petition debt owed to the debtor and could be setoff
against the prepetition tax liability. The violation of the
automatic stay was excused because the trustee did nothing
in reliance on the full payment of the refund. The setoff of
the refund against the post-petition tax liability was denied.
The District Court affirmed but the appellate court reversed
on the last issue, holding that the otherwise proper setoff of
the refund against post-petition interest on a prepetition tax
debt was not prohibited by the IRS failure to seek pre-setoff
relief from the automatic stay. In re Rush Hampton
Indus., Inc., 98 F.3d 614 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’g unrep. D.
Ct. dec. aff’g, 159 B.R. 343 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. In November
of 1996, the CFTC filed three administrative complaints
against four companies and two individuals for involvement
with hedge-to-arrive contracts. The CFTC took the position
that the contracts were illegal as off-exchange futures
contracts. In re Grain Land Co-op., CFTC Docket No 97-
1 (Nov. 13, 1996); In re Roger Wright, CFTC Docket No.
97-2 (Nov. 13, 1996); In re Southern Thumb Co-op., Inc.,
CFTC Docket No. 97-3 (Nov. 13, 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT. The plaintiff sold produce to the defendants who later
filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiff sought payment for the
produce from the PACA trust fund. The defendants were a
corporation which developed, owned and operated
restaurants and a subsidiary corporation which operated its
own restaurants. Both defendants argued that they were not
dealers in produce, under 7 U.S.C. § 499a(b)(6), subject to
PACA. The court noted that the statute was unambiguous
and included retailers with purchases of commodities over
$230,000 per year. The facts demonstrated that the
defendants purchased the produce from a wholesaler, the
plaintiff, for use in the restaurants and both defendants had
annual purchases of commodities exceeding $230,000. The
defendants argued that they were not retailers but were
consumers of the produce. The court held that the
defendants were subject to PACA as retailers because the
defendants enhanced the produce by cooking and other
preparation for serving to customers. The District Court
denied a motion by the debtors for an interlocutory appeal
because the debtors failed to demonstrate any extraordinary
ugency in the case. Matter of Magic Restaurants, Inc.,
197 B.R. 455 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996), app. denied, 202 B.R.
24 (D. Del. 1996).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations changing the designation of Oklahoma from a
modified accredited state to an accredited-free state. 61 Fed.
Reg. 67928 (Dec. 26, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* A beneficiary of a
decedent’s estate had owed personal income taxes and the
IRS had filed a lien against the beneficiary’s property.  The
beneficiary filed an effective disclaimer of any interest in
the estate property two months after the decedent’s death
and the estate argued that the lien did not attach to estate
property because the disclaimer removed any interest of the
beneficiary in the estate property. The court held that, upon
the death of the decedent, the beneficiary’s interest in estate
property immediately vested sufficiently for the lien to
attach and that the subsequent disclaimer had no effect on
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that attachment. Estate of Leggett v. United States, 96-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,698 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
DEFINITION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing the “check the box” method for entities not
required to be taxed as corporations  to elect to be taxed as
either a partnership or corporation. 61 Fed. Reg. 66584
(Dec. 18, 1996).
REORGANIZATIONS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations which provide for the deferral of the recognition
of gain or loss in certain readjustments of corporate
structure. Generally, the I.R.C. extends nonrecognition to an
exchange of stock which effects only a readjustment of
continuing interest in modified corporate form. Although a
right to acquire stock is not stock, the IRS believes that a
right to acquire stock may generally represent a form of
investment in the capital structure of the corporation that
justifies nonrecognition treatment as a security under I.R.C.
§§ 354, 355. Other provisions of the I.R.C. expressly
acknowledge the role that stock rights play in the capital
structure of a corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 317, 1032.
The proposed regulations provide that, for purposes of
Sections 354 and 355, the term securities includes ``rights to
acquire stock'' issued by a corporation that is a party to a
reorganization.
The proposed regulations treat rights to acquire stock
issued by a corporation that is a party to a reorganization as
securities of the corporation. For this purpose, the term
``rights to acquire stock'' of an issuing corporation has the
same meaning as the term has in Sections 305(d)(1) and
317(a). It does not include rights exercisable against persons
other than the issuer of the stock, or rights that relate to
property other than stock of the issuer of the rights. As
under current law, a conversion privilege contained in a
stock or debt instrument generally will not be considered a
separate property right received as part of the
reorganization. See Rev. Rul. 69-265, 1969-1 C.B. 109.
For purposes of Sections 354, 355 and 356, the proposed
regulations treat rights to acquire stock as securities having
no principal amount. As a result, a taxpayer will not be
required to recognize any gain under Section 356 upon the
receipt of a stock right. This will generally be the case
regardless of whether the taxpayer surrenders stock, stock
rights, or debt securities. 61 Fed. Reg. 67508 (Dec. 18,
1996).
The IRS has issued proposed regulations providing that
the continuity of shareholder interest (COSI) requirement
for corporate reorganizations is satisfied if the acquiring
corporation furnishes consideration which represents a
proprietary interest in the affairs of the acquiring
corporation and such consideration represents a substantial
part of the value of the stock or properties transferred.
Dispositions of stock of the acquiring corporation by a
former target shareholder generally are not taken into
account in determining whether continuity of shareholder
interest has been satisfied.
The early statutory definitions of reorganizations did not
specify the type of consideration required for a transaction
to qualify as a reorganization. As a result, a transaction may
have satisfied the literal definition of a reorganization even
if the transaction resembled a sale. To prevent such
transactions from qualifying as reorganizations, the COSI
requirement was established by the courts to ensure that the
consideration furnished by the acquiring corporation
represented a proprietary interest in the affairs of the
acquiring corporation and that such consideration
represented a substantial part of the value of the stock or
properties transferred. See Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co.,
296 U.S. 378 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co.
v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied
288 U.S. 599 (1933).
Dispositions of stock of the acquiring corporation by a
former target shareholder generally are not taken into
account in determining whether COSI has been satisfied.
However, the proposed regulations emphasize that all facts
and circumstances must be considered in determining
whether the acquiring corporation has in substance
furnished the required consideration. For example, if the
acquiring corporation or a related party, within the meaning
of Section 707(b)(1) or Section 267(b) without regard to
Section 267(e), purchases the acquiring corporation stock
shortly after the reorganization, all of the facts and
circumstances may indicate that the transaction should be
properly recast to treat the acquiring corporation as
furnishing cash in the reorganization, in which case the
reorganization would not satisfy the COSI requirement. 61
Fed. Reg. 67512 (Dec. 17, 1996).
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT . As part of an
employment termination agreement, the taxpayer’s
employer agreed to make payments for severance and
unused vacation. Some of the payments were made in one
tax year by electronic transfer as was the usual procedure
for payment of the taxpayer’s wages. However, some of the
payments were made by checks issued in the first tax year
and mailed to the taxpayer who received the checks in the
second tax year.  The IRS ruled that the payments received
by the checks were taxable in the second tax year because
the taxpayer did not have access to the funds until that year.
Ltr. Rul. 9651020, Sept. 19, 1996.
In one tax year, the taxpayer was charged with having
received excess travel advances from the employer. The
employer started withholding amounts from the taxpayer’s
wages for reimbursement of the advances in that same year.
The taxpayer brought suit to challenge the excess travel
advances and the suit was not resolved against the taxpayer
until the following tax year. The IRS argued that the
taxpayer constructively received the travel advances as
wages in the first year because the employer began
withholding amounts in that year. The court held that the
advances were not constructively received in the first tax
year because the taxpayer vigorously attacked the charge
and the issue was not decided until the next tax year. Duffy
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-556.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS . The taxpayer
had purchased a ranch for the purpose of subdividing the
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land into cabin lots. The land was purchased with money
borrowed from a bank. The loan terms provided for
payment of the loan by assigning the installment contracts
used to sell the individual cabin lots. When the bank became
insolvent, the FDIC took over as receiver and refused to
continue the loan payment terms. The FDIC and taxpayer
eventually settled for an amount of money less than the
original loan. The IRS argued that the difference was
discharge of indebtedness income to the taxpayer. The court
found that the method of payment of the original loan was
so indefinite that the true value of the loan was not
determined until the negotiations between the taxpayer and
the FDIC reached a settlement amount. The court held that
payment of the loan amount by assignment of installment
contracts was too indefinite to establish the fair market
value of the loan prior to the settlement agreement;
therefore, the negotiated payment was correctly treated as
the fair market value of the loan, resulting in no discharge of
indebtedness. Preslar v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-543.
EDUCATION EXPENSES. The IRS has ruled that the
decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992),
had no effect on the rules governing the deduction of
training expenses as current or capital expenses. The rule
remains that the expenses are capital if the future benefits of
the training are significantly greater than normal training
such that the training is similar to that provided during the
start-up of a business. Rev. Rul. 96-62, I.R.B. 1996-__, __.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
following letter was sent to Senator Thomas A Daschle by
Robert E. Rubin Secretary of the Department of the
Treasury:
“Thank you for your letter regarding the recently
released IRS ruling concerning AMT tax treatment for
individual farmers. The ruling states that farmers who
use the cash method of accounting are required to
include the fair market value of the sale of a crop in the
year in which the crop was sold for AMT purposes. As
you are aware, I met with Senators Baucus and Dorgan
and a member of your staff to discuss this matter.
“The Office of Tax Policy informs me that the IRS’s
ruling correctly interprets the current law. I understand
Congress may consider legislation early next session to
change this result for farmers who use cash accounting.
We would support the goals of this effort, as reasonable
tax policy, and we recognize it is likely that Congress
was not aware of the effect that its 1986 amendments to
the AMT would have on these farmers. I welcome the
opportunity to work with you to address this matter
through corrective legislation.”
INSURANCE. The taxpayers, husband and wife, were
the shareholders of a corporation. The taxpayers entered into
a split-dollar life insurance agreement with the corporation
under which the taxpayers created an irrevocable trust for
the benefit of the taxpayers’ children. The taxpayers
contributed to the trust the value of the economic benefit of
the life insurance policy for reimbursement to the
corporation for payment of the insurance premiums. The
corporation was prohibited from borrowing against the
policy and all ownership powers were vested in the trust
only. The IRS ruled that the split-dollar life insurance
agreement did not create a second class of stock and that the
corporation did not possess any incidents of ownership of
the insurance policy.  Ltr. Rul. 9651017, Sept. 18, 1996;
Ltr. Rul. 9651030, Sept. 20, 1996.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 6.03[1].*
DEFINITION. The taxpayers were a corporation and a
savings bank which orally agreed to join in the purchase of
real property, with the bank providing a source of borrowed
funds for the purchase and the corporation providing the
management of the purchased property. The property was
purchased and simultaneously sold at a capital gain, 50
percent of which was distributed to each taxpayer.  The IRS
disallowed the claimed allocation, arguing that no
partnership was formed because the bank did not provide
any capital or services, no partnership agreement was
written and signed, the parties did not agree to share any
losses, and the bank did not have any management rights.
The court held that a partnership did exist because (1) a
written partnership agreement was not necessary so long as
other evidence existed that the parties intended to form a
partnership, (2) the bank did provide capital in the form of
the promise to provide funds if no other source was found,
(3) sharing of losses was not required for the existence of a
partnership, and (4) the bank had given its management
rights to the corporation. 70 Acre Recognition Equipment
Partnership v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-547.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations governing the
“check the box” method for entities not required to be taxed
as corporations  to elect to be taxed as either a partnership or
corporation. 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 (Dec. 18, 1996).
TAX MATTERS PARTNER. The IRS has adopted as
final regulations for determining the tax matters partner of
LLCs which are taxed as partnerships. The regulations
provide that LLC members with the exclusive authority,
alone or with other members, to make management
decisions necessary for the conduct of LLC business are to
be treated as general partners for purposes of the tax matters
partner regulations. If no member has the exclusive
authority to manage the LLC business, then all members
will be treated as general partners for purposes of the tax
matters partner regulations. The regulations also incorporate
Rev. Proc. 88-16, 1988-1 C.B. 691 which provides the rules
for determining when it is impracticable for the IRS to
choose a tax matters partner on the basis of the holder of the
largest profits interest and what rules will be applied for
choosing the tax matters partner in that case. The
regulations make Rev. Rul 88-16 obsolete.  61 Fed. Reg.
67458 (Dec. 23, 1995), adding Treas. Reg. §
301.6231(a)(7)-2.
PENALTY EXPENSES. The taxpayer manufactured
agricultural fertilizers. The process of mixing fertilizer
could result in deficiencies in one or more components as
compared to the amounts listed on the containers for the
fertilizers. North Carolina and Virginia have laws requiring
the inspection of agricultural fertilizers to determine
whether the fertilizer ingredients match the amounts
represented by the manufacturers to their customers. If one
or more ingredients are found to be deficient, the state can
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assess an amount against the manufacturer which is then
paid to the purchasers of the fertilizer, if known,  or to the
state general treasury. The IRS argued that the amounts
assessed against the taxpayer were noncompensatory
penalties and were not deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. The court held that, because the assessed
amounts were intended to be paid to purchasers as
compensation for deficiencies in the fertilizer, the assessed
amounts were deductible as business expenses. Jenkins v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-539.
PENSION PLANS . The IRS has issued guidance, in the
form of questions and answers, for establishing a savings
incentive plan for employees (SIMPLE) under I.R.C. §
408(p). Notice 97-6, I.R.B. 1997-1, __.
The IRS has issued a model amendment for employers
who want to adopt SIMPLE provisions in their I.R.C. §
401(k) plans. Rev. Proc. 97-9, I.R.B. 1997-1, __.
RETURNS. The taxpayers filed their 1982 through
1985 tax returns late. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
testified that two returns were placed in one envelope and
two were placed in another envelope. The IRS received the
envelopes but claimed that only one return was in each
envelope. The taxpayers produced copies of the envelopes
with the postmark. The IRS sent notices to the taxpayers
that the missing returns had not been received but the
taxpayers did not read the notice. The court held that the
taxpayers’ testimony was insufficient to prove receipt of the
returns by the IRS, given the taxpayers’ failure to read the
notice which would have timely alerted the taxpayers of the
problem. Woodworth v. United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,106 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
The IRS has issued guidance for making elections
available under OBRA 1993. The election to treat debt
described under I.R.C. § 108(c)(3) that is discharged after
1992 as qualified real property indebtedness must be made
on Form 982, Reduction of Tax Attributes Due to Discharge
of Indebtedness, with a timely filed return for the tax year of
the discharge. IRS consent for a late election must be
requested under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
January 1997
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.63 5.55 5.51 5.59
110% AFR 6.20 6.11 6.06 6.03
120% AFR 6.77 6.66 6.61 6.57
Mid-term
AFR 6.10 6.01 5.97 5.94
110% AFR 6.72 6.61 6.56 6.52
120% AFR 7.34 7.21 7.15 7.10
Long-term
AFR 6.54 6.44 6.39 6.36
110% AFR 7.21 7.08 7.02 6.98
120% AFR 7.88 7.73 7.66 7.61
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has announced
that it will soon issue guidance for corporations to change
their accounting period and make an S corporation election
without prior written consent from the IRS. Notice 97-3,
I.R.B. 1997-1, __.
DEFINITION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing the “check the box” method for entities not
required to be taxed as corporations  to elect to be taxed as
either a partnership or corporation. 61 Fed. Reg. 66584
(Dec. 18, 1996).
SHAREHOLDER’S INTEREST. The IRS has adopted
as final regulations governing the determination of a
shareholder’s pro rata share of S corporation items of
income, loss, deduction and credit. Under the regulations,
each shareholder’s pro rata share of an item is determined
by assigning an equal portion of each item to each day of
the corporation’s taxable year, unless an election is made to
terminate the taxable year because of termination of a
shareholder’s interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1(a)(1). For
this purpose, an S corporation's taxable year does not
include any day in which the corporation did not have any
shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1(a)(2)(i). If a
shareholder transfers all stock or dies, the shareholder is
treated as a shareholder on the day of the transfer or death.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1(a)(2)(ii).
If a shareholder’s entire interest in the corporation is
terminated, the remaining shareholders can unanimously
elect to apply the above rules as if the corporation tax year
was split into two taxable years. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1(b).
A terminated shareholder’s interest in the corporation as an
owner of an option to purchase stock, creditor, employee,
director or other non-shareholder capacity is disregarded.
The election does not otherwise affect the S corporation’s
taxable year or filing date.
The election takes precedence over the election provided
by Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(g)(2) but is not allowed if the S
corporation election is terminated. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-
1(b).
The regulations also define “post-termination transition
period” as (1) the period beginning on the day after the last
day of the taxable year as an S corporation and ending on
the later of one year later or the due date of the return for the
last taxable year and (2) 120 days after a determination that
the S corporation election had terminated. Treas. Reg. §
1.1377-2. 61 Fed. Reg. 67454 (Dec. 22, 1996).
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX. The taxpayer was
retired and received full social security payments as a “fully
insured individual.” The taxpayer had self-employment
income for 1993 but did not pay any self-employment tax
because the taxpayer was receiving full social security
benefits. The court held that eligibility for full social
security benefits had no impact on the taxpayer’s liability
for self-employment tax on self-employment income.
Foster v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-552.
TAX RATES. The standard deductions for 1997 are
$6,900 for joint filers, $6,050 for heads of households,
$4,150 for single filers and $3,450 for married individuals
who file separately. The personal exemption is $2,650. The
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IRS also announced the inflation adjusted tax tables and
other inflation adjusted figures for 1997. Rev. Proc. 96-59.
TAXPAYER RIGHTS. The IRS has announced the
one-year extension of the Test Mediation Procedure
provided in Ann. 95-86, I.R.B. 1995-44, 27. Ann. 97-1,
I.R.B. 1997-1, __.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ATTACHMENT. This case involved four Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases. Two debtors were husband and wife, one
debtor was a farm corporation solely owned by the husband
and one debtor was a farm corporation solely owned by the
wife. Three creditors claimed priority security interests in
various of the debtors’ assets.  One creditor had a 1992
security agreement signed by the husband, wife and
husband’s corporation but the agreement did not contain a
description of the land on which the crops were grown.
Another 1992 security agreement was signed only by the
husband. A 1994 security agreement was signed by all four
parties. The creditor argued that all of the security
agreements, taken together demonstrated a perfected
security interest in all of the debtors’ assets. The court held
that the composite document theory could not be applied to
correct the deficiencies of the various security agreements;
therefore, the creditor did not have a perfected security
interest in the debtors’ crops until a security agreement was
signed by each party and contained a description of the land
on which the collateral crops were to be grown. The second
creditor had similar problems with its security interests but
argued that supplemental documentation included with the
loan contained the land description and was attached to the
security agreement sufficient to be included in the security
agreement. The court again held that the composite
document theory could not be used to perfect the security
interest as to the crops. The court also held that the
incomplete security interests did not attach once the crops
were harvested. The creditors attempted to include the
husband’s corporation as a secured party, although only the
husband signed some of the security agreements, by arguing
that the corporation was the alter ego of the husband and
that the two debtors were melded by the bankruptcy cases.
The court held that the corporation was a separate entity and
was not joined with the husband as one debtor since the two
bankruptcy cases were not consolidated. In re Kevin W.
Emercik Farms, Inc., 201 B.R. 790 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1996).
BAILMENT. The debtors entered into a hog feeding
and breeding contract with the defendant, a creditor in the
debtors’ bankruptcy case. Under the contract, the defendant
purchased the hogs to be raised by the debtors, with the
purchase price credited to the debtors’ account with the
defendant. The hogs were sold at market weight in the
defendant’s name with the defendant paying any amounts
due to the debtors. The debtors were responsible for all
operations costs and were liable for any loss of the hogs.
The debtors paid a monthly “service fee” calculated as a
percentage of the hog inventory value. The contract allowed
the defendant to terminate the contract at any time without
penalty but did not grant the debtors the same right.  Several
provisions in the contract identified the defendant as the
owner of the hogs; however, the debtors argued that the
contract was actually a security agreement and was
avoidable in the bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Court had
ruled that the contract was a security agreement because (1)
the “service fee” was actually an interest charge, (2) the
debtors were liable for all losses, (3) the hogs acted as a
guarantee of payment, and (4) there was no provision under
which the debtors could surrender the hogs and be free of
any obligation for the hogs. The District Court reversed,
holding that the language of the contract was unambiguous
in establishing a bailment contract and that the unusual
provisions focused on by the Bankruptcy Court were
insufficient to make the contract ambiguous so as to allow
interpretation of the contract as a security agreement.
Matter of Porter, 202 B.R. 109 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
PERFECTION-ALM § 13.01.* The debtor was a cotton
merchant which entered into an agreement with another
cotton merchant in which the cotton merchant agreed to
repurchase certificated cotton from the debtor. The cotton
remained in the possession of the debtor but the merchant
took possession of the warehouse receipts as collateral for
funds expended to repurchase the cotton. Both parties were
to attempt to sell the cotton, with the proceeds used to repay
the loan. After the cotton was repurchased, the debtor
wanted to decertify the cotton and recertify the cotton in
order to remove overage charges. The merchant agreed to
release the warehouse receipts to a subdepository company
connected to another creditor of the debtor. The
subdepository issued farmer trust receipts for the warehouse
receipts and blocked the warehouse receipts on its books.
The court held that the subdepository was a bailee for the
cotton merchant and that the merchant’s security interest in
the warehouse receipts, established when the merchant
originally took possession of them, was retained when the
subdepository, as bailee, took possession of the receipts and
issued a farmer trust receipts for the warehouse receipts and
blocked off the warehouse receipts on its books. In re
Julien Co., 202 B.R. 89 (W.D. Tenn. 1996), aff’g, 168
B.R. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Arndt, 201 B.R. 853 (M.D. Fla. 1996), aff’g, 158
B.R. 863 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (employees) see Vol. 7,
p. 162.
Estate of Lucas v. United States, 97 F.3d 1401 (11th
Cir. 1996) (special use valuation) see Vol. 7 p. 177.
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PRODUCER'S LIEN. The debtor was a cannery which
purchased tomatoes from a farmer. One of the officers of
the debtor was an acquaintance of the farmer and
approached the farmer with the contract to purchase the
tomatoes. In the first year, the farmer signed an agreement
to subordinate the farmer's producer lien to the debtor's
secured creditor. That contract was successfully completed
by both parties. In the second year, the farmer also signed
the subordination agreement but the debtor filed for
bankruptcy before the farmer was fully paid and the
creditor claimed a priority security interest in the debtor's
remaining assets. The farmer had many years of experience
in growing and selling tomatoes but could not read words
and relied on others to explain the contents of contracts.
Although the farmer understood the nature of the
subordination agreement, the farmer relied on the oral
statements of the debtor's officers that the company was in
good financial health and that the subordination agreement
was needed only to obtain the funds for payment of the
tomatoes. The farmer argued that the subordination
agreement was not an effective waiver of the producer's lien
because the farmer did not have complete information
about the rights which were given up. The court held that
the subordination agreement was not effective because of
the misrepresentations of the debtor's officers which either
misled the farmer or failed to provide the farmer with
sufficient information for a knowledgeable waiver. On
appeal, the court reversed, holding that the debtor was not
required to provide financial information in order to justify
the subordination agreement and the level of fraud alleged
was insufficient to overcome the subordination agreement.
In re GVF Cannery, Inc., 202 B.R. 140 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 188 B.R. 651 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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